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The Method of Screening Operational Concepts of Warfare
Model (MOSCOW) is a low resolution analytic tool designed by
the RAND Corporation to assist decisionmakers in comparing
the performance of alternative warfighting doctrines.
Recent analysis of this model suggest its current battle
attrition mechanism places unreasonable conceptual limits on
the mode 1 ' s usefulness. This thesis considers an
alternative way to compute battle attrition which does not




The reader is cautioned that computer programs
developed in this research may not have been exercised for
all cases of interest. While every effort has been made,
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are
free of computational and logic errors, they cannot be
considered validated. Any application of these programs
without additional verification is at the risk of the user.
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The U.S. Army currently uses several different computer
simulations to determine the effects of nev; weapons and
different strategies on its ability to both wage and win
war. By proper use of these simulations, decision makers
can discover how to best employ men and equipment. These
models vary from those which focus on the characteristics
and use of individual weapons to those which concentrate or,
the characteristics of many weapon systems that are combined
or aggregated to form the basic component of a model s
struct u r e
.
Basically, combat simulations or combat models are
divided into two different categories: high resolution and
low resolution. High resolution models usually define mode;
structures that represent exactly one piece of equipment
such as a tank or artillery howitzer. As such. they
concentrate on demonstrating the tactics of weapons
employment and allow for significant user input in
controlling the flow of battle. Models that represent
aggregated forces are in the second category; low resolution
models. Typically, these models provide insight to issues
such as where large units of men and equipment should be
positioned to maximize their contribution to campaign
1
winning. Beyond this, low resolution models also consider
logistical factors such as resupply and maintenance of
equipment in order to better understand how these factors
can influence campaign outcome. Output from these models
address issues on a strategic level such as. "How can a
commander best use his assets to accomplish the mission?"
Philip J. Romero of the Rand Corporation developed a new
low resolution model called MOSCOW (Method of Screening
Concepts of Operational Warfare) [Ref.13. MOSCOW s purpose
is to provide a quantitative model that allows users to
compare different concepts in waging war. These war fighting
concepts, more commonly referred to as doctrines, are those
methods that high level leaders have decided to use in
waging war <i .e. Mobile Defense as opposed to a Static
Defense). The definition of the current: Army doctrine can
be found in an unclassified Department of the Army Field
Manual [Ref . 21
.
In developing his model, Philip Romero intended to make
the model easy to use. With this purpose in mind, MOSCOW
was written on a Lotus spreadsheet (compatible with personal
computers) consisting of 1040 x 57 cells and generally takes
on the order of seconds to recalculate. The model is
capable of aggregating force sizes at the theater level. By
calculation using various inputs, MOSCOW produces an output
estimating the required friendly force size needed to
produce a desired attrition upon a known enemy force.
Past evaluations of MOSCOW suggest that its method for
computing aggregate combat attrition performs poorly in
certain situations [Ref. 3D. This thesis compares MOSCOW s
current attrition mechanism with a possible alternative.
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Previous analysis of MOSCOW demonstrated that a
fundamental limitation in the model is that it relies solely
on the Lanchestrian square law formulation for calculating
combat attrition losses. Detailed explanations of
Lanchestrian formulations and the use of the square lav; for
attritions can be found in numerous sources [Ref. 41. This
results in two conceptual limitations on the representation
of battle processes in MOSCOW [Ref. 3: p. 7]:
1. The proportion of direct and indirect fire systems as
a fraction of the total force remains constant over
the entire ba 1 1 1 e .
2. The rate at which targets become available to indirect
fire systems is constant for the duration of the
battle.
These limitations are arguably unreasonable.
The first limitation is unreasonable simply because it
may not necessarily be true. It is natural to expect that
direct fire systems (e.g. tanks and infantry fighting
vehicles) are killed at a proportionally higher rate than
indirect fire systems. Furthermore, it is easy to conceive
of concepts of warfighting which rely predominantly on
direct or indirect fire as a means of attritino the enemy.
Such concepts would surely not be capable of maintaining a
constant proportion of direct and indirect fire weapon
systems throughout the duration of a battle or several
batt les.
The second limitation is unreasonable because it is
hard, if not impossible to estimate the constant number of
targets available to indirect fire systems. The actual
number is in fact a function of scenario, intelligence on
enemy positions, availability of target acquisition systems
and the current point in the battle itself. It is not known
how to "average" or even obtain estimates for the number of
targets engaged in each indirect, fire engagement.
Thus, the problem confronted by this thesis is to
cieve i op an alternative at tr i t i on mechan i sm for the MOSCOW
mode! which eliminates these conceptual limitations.
C. SOLUTION APPROACH
This paper proposes to use a heterogeneous Lanchester
attrition mechanism as an alternative to MOSCOW s current
squ a re law f or mu 1 a t ion.
II. MOSCOW'S METHODOLOGY
A. THE BASIC MODEL IN MOSCOW
MOSCOW was designed to meet a need for analysis that
existing models were unable to provide.
"There was a need for a broad, quantitative model that
could rapidly provide appraisals of a wide variety of
concepts with modest data requirements and a consequent
low level of resolution." [Ref. 1: p. xl
Most c omba t s i mu 1 at i on mode 1 s use k i 1 1 er- v i c t i m
scoreboards to display the results of a battle due to f ixed
i nputs (fixed inputs are those parameters defined as
starting strengths, lethalities etc.). A killer- victim
scoreboard displays the outcome of a battle in terms of
killer (those vehicles that caused a casualty) and victim
(vehicles that were destroyed). Analysis of these results
provides analysts with a view of the battle and therefore
allows a determination of which systems were most effective.
MOSCOW, on the other hand, uses a specified outcom e (desired
enemy attrition and maximum penetration limit) and estimates
the number of friendly forces needed to produce this result.
A model with an ability to determine the force levels
needed to achieve a desired outcome is valuable to military
commanders. By using MOSCOW, commanders can gain insight on
the amount of forces needed to achieve victory. By
comparing these results for different scenarios, commanders
can measure which force designs may work best in particular
scenar i os
.
"It [MOSCOW] emphasizes those policy variables that
especially pertain to the operational level of war,
i.e., those choices within the purview of corps, army
group, or theater commanders." [Ref. 1: p. 121]
MOSCOW'S interna] composition is complex. Inputs
consist of over 350 variables within the Lotus spreadsheet.
The model is essentially a set of simultaneous equations,
and therefore successive recalculations dre required for the
model to converge to a solution.
Given the starting conditions of any engagement, MOSCOW
uses the battlefield geometry (a bounded area both front and
rear, with a border between opposing forces) and other
initial force parameters such as the enemy rate of advance
and the friendly rate of fire to calculate the campaign kill
rate with units of number of kills per day per unit. The
other rate determined within MOSCOW is called the required
kill rate (Equation i). Simply stated, the required kill
rate is the rate at which the friendly force must ki i 1 the
enemy force to achieve mission success. This rate would
have units of the number of units that have to be killed per
day. In a given scenario, the friendly force size required
to produce the desired battle outcome is calculated by
dividing the required kill rate by the campaign kill rate.
The following simplified example of MOSCOW s process of
calculation gives a flavor of the mode 1 ' s underlying
structure and complexity.
(ttenemy k i 1 1 ed)/<Tlme aval 1 abl e)=Requ 1 red kill rate <1>
The commander of the friendly forces desires to destroy
10 enemy divisions within an allowable penetration of 40
kilometers (the friendly rear border). If enemy forces move
at a rate of 8 kilometers per day, then it would take them 5
days to reach the rear border. In other words, the friendly
forces must kill 10 enemy divisions in 5 days or less.
(40 km) / (8 km/day) = 5 days = Time available
(10 enemy divisions) / (5 days) = 2 div./ day
If the friendly force must mass 1.5 friendly units for
each enemy division it faced in an attack, and each friendly
unit Is capable of destroying .2 enemy divisions per attack,
with each attack lasting for two days then the campaign kill
rate (Equation 2) of the friendly force would be
:
(#kills/atk) / (#units/atk)x(#days/atk) = Campaign kill rate
(.2 kills/attack)/(1.5 units/attack)jr(2 days/ attack) = 0.066 killsldaylunit (2)
Dividing the required kill rate by the campaign kill rate
gives the resulting number of friendly forces needed for
mission accomplishment (Equation 3). For more information
on the above simple example, see [Ref. 1: pp. 160-163].
Required kill rate/Campaign kill rate = # of friendly units (3)
(2 div. /day) / (.066 kl 1 1 s/day/unl t ) = 30 units
To calculate the battle attrition, the battle calculus
within MOSCOW comprises the following seven elements:
1. The engagement initiation criterion which is the
tactical attacker and defender combat power ratio
(combat power is calculated as the number of vehicles
times the square root of the lethality coefficient).
The units of the lethality coefficient are
dimension 1 ess (i.e. lethality has been defined In
MOSCOW [Ref. 1] as the portion of enemy vehicles
killed per hour). The starting strengths for both
sides is also needed.
CombatTower = ( # of vehicles ) x Jlethality (4)
2. The hardness of the vehicles which accounts for each
vehicle's vulnerability to destruction.
3. The availability of vehicles depending upon their
movements (stationary or moving) and acquisition
probabl 1 i t les.
4. The lethality coefficient of the vehicles which
incorporates the enemy hardness and availability. A
thesis written by Mark Hanson [Ref. 43, addresses 30
MOSCOW coefficients and usable ranges for their
val ues.
5. The engagement termination criterion (attrition
Imposed on or suffered by the defender) as an input by
the attacker.
6. The engagement duration and vehicle attrition.
7. Blue's consumption during the engagement of additional
commodities such as petrol ium, oil, lubricants (POL),
ammunition etc.
Element 6 is calculated by combining elements 1, 4 and
5. A form of the square law Lanchester equation is then
used (Equation 5) to calculate the time needed for the
battle. tRef. 1: pp. 357-358, 370-374]
8






R Is the Initial size of the enemy force
B Is the Initial size of the friendly force
r Is the lethality of the enemy force
b Is the lethality of the friendly force
t is the time in days
s Is the percentage of enemy that survive
Once the engagement duration has been calculated, the
square law Lanchester 1 an equation (Equation 6) is used (as
opposed to the Inverted form of the Lanchester equation used
to calculate the time of battle) to calculate vehicle
attr 1 t Ions.
R{t)




R is the initial size of the enemy force
B is the initial size of the friendly force
r Is the lethality of the enemy force
b Is the lethality of the friendly force
t Is the time in days
R(t) is the surviving strength of the enemy force
B. NECESSITY FOR SPREADSHEET RECALCULATION
MOSCOW, in order to attain the final value of the
campaign kill rate, must recalculate its system of
simultaneous equations. Philip Romero (MOSCOW'S author)
states clearly why the need for recalculations exists, and
that usually within 12-15 iterations the program values will
be close enough to be considered to have converged [Ref. 5:
p. 153. Since MOSCOW uses a system of simultaneous
equations, they are dependent upon each other. The
constantly changing values (depending on the current battle
that is ongoing within MOSCOW) will eventually converge.
Listed below are the three main reasons MOSCOW must be
recalculated to produce this convergence.
First, vehicles are assumed to be uniformly distributed
throughout the battlefield. The distance each unit must
move until the desired combat power ratio is attained
(Equation 4) is, therefore, inversely related to the density
of the units in the zone. In other words, if there is a
high density of vehicles in the zone then the movement time
is low and vice versa. The density of the vehicles is a
function of the output of the model, therefore, the model's
output depends upon itself. Note, however, that an increase
in the number of units on the battlefield will result in an
increase in density which decreases the movement time (to
accumulate combat power) which in turn decreases the number
10
of units required (in the zone) and therefore, the system of
relationships is logically convergent. [Ref, 1: p. 1563
Secondly, air support and the other supporting forces
(such as Corps artillery units) are responsible for imposing
a certain average amount of delay per day. Some of these
supporting assets (such as air support interdiction) attrit
the enemy over the course of the entire campaign (a campaign
could possibly consist of several battles). Therefore, in
longer campaigns, the average delay per day of a fixed asset
will be lower than that of a shorter campaign. Thus, an
increase in campaign length will lower the average delay per
day which in turn will cause the enemy forces to have a
higher advance rate which will lower the campaign length and
therefore, again, the system of relationships is convergent.
[Ref. i : p. 160]
Finally, the distance between opposing forces will be
smaller as the battle progresses. The closer the forces,
the more lethal the attacker becomes. As the attacker
becomes more lethal, the time needed to impose a specified
amount of attrition upon the defender will be lowered.
Therefore, the distance between the opposing forces can be
larger which in turn will lower the attackers lethality
which will in turn increase the time of the battle and.
again, these relationships are logically convergent. [Ref.
1 : p. 176]
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The three reasons listed above explain the need for
recalculation of the MOSCOW spreadsheet. Because of this,
It is not possible to "see" the results as the bottle
progresses but only to "see" the starting conditions and
final product. The reliance of MOSCOW upon the Lanchester
square law for attrition, combined with a dependence of
having simultaneous equations eventually converge, is an
area for further improvement.
C. PROBLEM AREAS
Although the basic structure of MOSCOW is built upon the
need for a model that can output data based upon a specified
outcome, it still lacks the ability to properly handle the
following four areas.
As previously mentioned, MOSCOW assumes that the ratio
of the number of indirect weapon systems to the total force
si e remains constant throughout the engagement. If we are
to believe this assumption, then any attrition delivered to
direct fire forces will have proportionally the same effect
on indirect fire forces. Common sense tells us that in any
tank heavy battle, the direct systems will suffer a much
larger attrition rate than the indirect systems simply
because the direct systems (tanks) are engaged in a close
combat battle while their supporting indirect elements
(artillery) are some distance to the rear.
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Additionally, once the initial forces within MOSCOW have
been aggregated, all subsequent units must be of the same
composition. Independent units such as a separate artillery
brigade or an armored brigade could not be included in the
simulation since their compositions are vastly different
than a standard armored or mechanized Infantry division
(e.g. an artillery brigade consists of 244 howitzers and
tanks)
.
During any engagement, the attacker continues to assault
the defender until one of two conditions are met. First, if
the attacker successfully achieves a desired level of
attrition on the defending force, the attack ceases.
Second, if the attacker is annihilated, then the attack
again ceases. Common sense would normally prevail in the
second case and the attacking commander would call off the
attack prior to his unit's destruction.
Finally, allocation of indirect fires is simply omitted.
A variable is needed to determine the percent of indirect
fire that should be placed upon the enemy's direct and
indirect fire weapon systems.
In attempting to resolve the limitations within the
MOSCOW model (and the ensuing problems listed above), a
heterogeneous Lanchester attrition equation is proposed that
separately accounts for the effects due to direct and
indirect fire systems.
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE HETEROGENEOUS MODEL
A. MODEL APPROACH
The heterogeneous model was developed to show a
different approach to attrition analysis. By separating
the effects of direct and indirect fire, individual
contributions of each system can be further analyzed.
MOSCOW uses a deterministic approach involving a system
of simultaneous equations because its attrition equation
(square law) has a closed form solution. The heterogeneous
model will also use a deterministic approach, but a closed
form solution is not generally known when attrition
equations involve the use of both the square and linear law.
As a result, the heterogeneous model will use a time-step
algorithm for calculating combat attrition. Appendix A
contains the actual program code with detailed variable
descriptions. A listing of the inputs used with the program
can be found in Appendix B. Further information on the
Lanchest r i an theory of attrition can be found in research by
Taylor [Ref. 6].
B. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The heterogeneous model separates the effects of direct
and indirect weapon systems. Since the effects of these
systems will be calculated separately, every engagement
14
will, therefore, have four weapon systems available for
attrition purposes. These weapon systems rxce listed in
Table 1
,
TABLE 1. WEAPON SYSTEMS AVAILABLE IN AN ENGAGEMENT







'Blue" represents friendly forces and "Red" refers to the
enemy force.
C. ATTRITION MECHANSIMS
Tab 1 e 2 lists the weapon syst ems at t r i t i on re 1 at i onsh i ps
which are possible in each engagement in the proposed model.
Significantly, there are no Firer-Target relationships for
direct fire systems to engage indirect fire targets. The
elimination of these relationships from the model is based
on the assumption that this type of attrition makes a small
contribution to total battlefield attrition. This is
because current indirect fire weapons are doctrine! y
positioned to preclude the possibility of attack from direct
fire weapons. Table 2 lists the Firer-Target relationships
contained in the proposed attrition model.
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TABLE 2. FIREP VERSUS TARGET ATTRITIONS
Firer Target
i. Blue direct Red direct
2. Blue indirect Red direct
3. Blue indirect Red indirect
4. Red direct Blue direct
5. Red indirect Blue direct
6. Red indirect Blue indirect
1. Lanchestrian Linear Law
The linear law is used to model attrition from area
fire weapons. This lav gives no advantage to concentrating
forces on the battlefield. As such, this relationship is
oten used to mode! indirect fire (artillery) weapons [Ref.
7 3 . Equation 7 is an example of the linear law.
dX/dt = -aXY (7)
Wh ere,
X represents the number of targets
Y represents the number of firers
dX is the change in the X force
dt is the change in time (time interval)
a is the attrition coefficient
Simply stated, the linear law shows that the
resulting attrition to an enemy force is a function of both
the number of targets and the number of firers. The
16
attrition coefficient a, is calculated from several inputs.
The units of a , are
:
ctf killed) .- (# firers) <# targets) (unit time)
2. Lanchestrian Square Law
Attrition produced by direct fire systems, on the
other hand, is often modelled using the Lanchester square
law attrition CRef. 7], This law models that aspect of war
where individual targets can be identified ana attacked.
This is a model of "aimed fire" and therefore typically used
with direct fire weapons. Equation 8 shows the square law
f ormu 1 at i on
.
dX/dt = -bY <R)
Where .
Y represents the number of firers
dX is the change in the X force
dt is the change in time (time interval)
b is the attrition coefficient
The units of the attrition coefficient b, are:
(# killed) / (# firers) (unit time)
3. Vehicle Attrition Calculation
Using the information from Table 2, Figure 1
illustrates the attrition that will oc c u r g i v e n a n
17
engagement. Note that the direct fire systems of both
forces are attrlted by the opposing direct and indirect fire




Figure 1. Attrition by different weapon systems
With Blue as the X force, and Red as the Y force,
Table 3 shows how the linear law and the square law can be
applied to describe the attrition casualties produced by
each type of system. Subscripts indicate different
attrition coefficients. Explanations of the variables used
to calculate the attrition coefficients are in Appendix C.
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TABLE ?. APPLICABLE ATTRITION EQUATIONS
Ei rer Taraet At t r i t i on Equat i on
Blue di rect




















- a 2X jY n,
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Figure 1 shows that direct fire attrition for each force
results from a combination of direct. -direct and
i ndi rect --di rect fires. By combining the appropriate-
equations, the attrition relationships for direct fire
svsterns (of both X and Y) are:
For the X force
a no .
For the Y force
dXD/dt = -b^i'r) b2XDY!
dYD/dt = -a,X D - a 2XjYD
In comparison, indirect systems are attrited only by
opposing indirect systems ( counterbat tery battles). The
resulting attrition relationships are:
For the X force
and
,
For the Y force
dXj/dt = -b3X I Y I
dYj/dt = -a3X I Y I
19
D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO MODELS
Although many similarities exist between the two models
(MOSCOW and the heterogeneous model), there are some
differences. To understand the development of the
heterogeneous model, these differences need to be
1 1 1 uml nated.
1. The Changing FLOT (Front Line of Troops)
MOSCOW Iterates (recalculates) its simultaneous
equations until convergence. At the point of convergence,
the average distance between the two forces is calculated
using the following equation.
,.
initial distance + final distance
average distance = . /m
The resulting answer is then used as the distance between
the two forces throughout the engagement (as if they had
remained stationary).
The heterogeneous model, on the other hand,
calculates the distance between the forces for each time
interval (the time-step interval). The speed of the unit
multiplied by this time Interval computes the distance moved
In the time Interval. Calculations that determine vehicular
speed are shown in the following example.
The vehicular speed of the Blue's indirect forces
has an Input value of 25 kph . If the commander estimates
20
that at any moment in the battle approximately 2/3 of his
force will be firing while the remaining 1/3 will be moving.
then the speed calculated for the indirect force is shown in
Equation 10.
(25 kph><l/3) + CO kph)(2/3) = 8.33 kph (10)
Therefore, the speed of 8.33 kph would be used for Blue's
indirect vehicles. The values for the indirect vehicles are
from an illustration by Hoffman [Ref. 8: pp. 24-25].
2. All ocat ion of Fire
Decisions are made by military commanders to
dedicate certain portions of their force against a specific
portion of the enemy (i.e. 30% of the indirect force may be
dedicated to fire only at indirect fire systems while the
remaining 70% may be firing only at the direct fire
systems). MOSCOW does not have a mechanism to describe this
allocation. The heterogeneous model uses an additional
variable within attrition coefficient calculations to permit
a description of a specific force allocation scenario.
3. Attacker Annihilation
MOSCOW fails to determine a breakpoint at which the
attacker will quit the battle should he receive a large
amount of attrition. Without this feature, it is possible
that the attacker, in an attempt to attrit the enemy, will
attack until he is annihilated. This clearly makes no
21
sense. The heterogeneous model uses an input that allows
the user to determine a maximum level of attrition he is
willing to receive in an attack.
4. Range Degradation
An additional factor used in the heterogeneous model
accounts for degradation of weapon performance as a function
of range. Bonder, [Ref. 7: pp. 30-32] derived the following
equations from his studies on range dependency.
dX/dt= -a(r )Y ( 11 )
dY/dt= -b(r)X ( 12)
In Equations 11 and 12. the value of the function r
is derived from the following formula:
aCr)= a (l-r/rmax ) u for < r < rmax (13)
for r Z rmax
Where
,
r is the current range of the two opposing systems and
r max iS the maximum effective range of the weapon
u is the exponential factor, unique for each weapon
syst em
.
Figure 2 shows the effects of different values of u
in Equation 13. Tanks, as direct fire weapons, would use
values of u close to 1 . At short ranges, there would be a
high probability of kill, and at longer ranges a linear
22
relationship with a lower probability of kill. Artillery,
on the other hand would use a much smaller value of u (close
to 0) that would indicate a very small range effect on the
probability of kill (range has a small effect for artillery
unless the range is either less than the minimum range of
the weapon or beyond the maximum range of the system).
Probability of kill for both weapon systems reaches zero
when the range exceeds the maximum effective range.
DIFFERENT VALUES OF MU







Various values of u for the Bonder range
E. BREAKPOINT CRITERION
1. Attacker Breakpoint
As previously mentioned, a primary difference
between the heterogeneous model and MOSCOW is that MOSCOW
23
has no breakpoint criterion for the attacker (i.e., the
attacker can possibly attack until his annihilation). The
criterion used in the heterogeneous model is an input value:
i.e. the user inputs a value representing the maximum amount




Determining the breakpoint criterion for the
defender is a different process which involves the following
parameters
:
i. ATKDES-The attacker's desired attrition upon the
defender (e.g. 75%).
2. DEFDES-The defender s tolerable attrition should he be
attacked (e.g. 50%).
3. DISENG-The fraction of engagements that the attacker
is able to dictate the duration (e.g. 80%). This
variable attempts to illuminate a force's ability to
"control" the length of the battle.
To illustrate this process, consider the following
example: Blue attacks Red and desires to attrit Red by 75%.
Blue is also able to dictate 80% of the duration of
engagements, while Red desires to lose no more than 50% of
his force should Blue attack. MOSCOW (and the heterogeneous
model) use the following formula (Equation 14) to determine
the defender (Red) breakpoint criterion.
Defender Breakpoi nt=DEFDES + (DISENG x (ATKDES-DEFDES) ) (14)
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Using the values from the example above, the
resulting defender breakpoint criterion becomes:
Defender Breakpoint = .5 + (.8 x (.75-. 5)) = 70% attrition.
The value (70%) indicates that although the attacker
(Blue) wishes to attrit Red by 75%, he only "controls" 80
percent of the engagement, and therefore is unable to
achieve his desired attrition level. Red, on the other
hand, desires to lose no more than 50 percent, but is unable
to control the flow of the battle, and is therefore forced
to continue defending until he reaches 70 percent attrition,
or Blue reaches its breakpoint (whichever comes first).
3. Artillery Breakpoint
For both Red and Blue indirect forces, the
breakpoint attrition level is an input value. When this
value is reached, all of a force's indirect fire systems are
considered to be ineffective and no longer participate in
the battle. The remaining indirect systems (of the
effective force) then change their allocation of fire and
concentrate 100 percent of their fire on the opposing direct
fire systems. If a direct fire breakpoint is reached, the
direct fire battle ends immediately and indirect fire
systems on both sides concentrate 100 percent of their fires
on a counterbattery battle (which may last much longer than
the direct-direct battle).
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F. VALUE OF THE HETEROGENEOUS MODEL
The model was developed for several purposes. First, it
can be used as a tool to assist commanders in their decision
making process. Commanders are allowed greater flexibility
in changing their force structure by determining the
possible consequences of their decisions as a result of each
weapon systenTs independent attrition. Additions of
non-homogeneous units (i.e. artillery brigades) are not
allowed in the current version of the MOSCOW model.
Additionally, the model forecast force augmentation
configurations necessary for success given a predicted Red
threat scenario. Finally, the heterogeneous simulation may
be stopped at any point In the battle for analysis and then
modified and continued if desired.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HETEROGENEOUS MODEL PERFORMANCE
A. ANALYSIS WITHIN AN ENGAGEMENT
Models are designed to simulate possible outcomes of
engagements given certain input conditions. Since these
battles have not actually occurred, real data for comparison
purposes are not available. Therefore, analysts are left to
assess a model's validity by evaluating its performance
according to expectations based on informed judgement.
By comparing the results of one model with those of
another, model differences can be seen by specifying a
common scenario. Analysts can then gauge the degree of
"within engagement" difference between the two models
representations of battle processes. If these differences
are relatively small, then there is arguably no difference
between the models and the choice of using one model over
another must be made based on other criteria such as
computational complexity, ease of use, or other factors.
A comparison of MOSCOW'S current attrition process and
the heterogeneous attrition model is especially simple using
the ratio of the numbers of indirect to direct fire weapon
systems. As Hoffman [Ref. 3] shows, the assumptions
underlying the current MOSCOW attrition process fix this
ratio as a constant value of the systems present at the
start of an engagement. Using the heterogeneous model, the
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value of this ratio typically fluctuates during an
engagement. Figure 3 shows a comparison of how this ratio
varies for the proposed heterogeneous attrition model and
the performance of the current MOSCOW attrition algorithm
during a hypothetical engagement.
PERCENTAGE OF BLUE'S INDIRECT FORCE COMPARED TO




















Figure 3. A comparison of the ratio of Blue's Indirect to
direct weapons for MOSCOW and the heterogeneous model during
an engagement
.
Model inputs for the initial force levels are shown in
Table 4. These inputs were derived from simulating an
engagement of two Red (Soviet) divisions opposed by a Blue
(U.S.) force. The Blue force is attacking with a
four-to-one advantage in total weapon systems.
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TABLE 4. FORCE STRUCTURES OF A HYPOTHETICAL ENGAGEMENT.
Weapon system Number of Vehicles
Red direct fire 1557
Red Indirect fire 424
Blue direct fire 6228
Blue Indirect fire 484
A statistical measure of the degree to which these
ratios differ is given by the R 2 statistic defined by
Equation 15 [Ref. 9: p. 6403. This is an application of the
R2 statistic common to regression analysis. In this case,
R 2 provides a measure of the degree to which the constant
ratio result of the current MOSCOW model agrees with the








y is the average value of the sum of the yj's
yj is the value of the heterogeneous model for 1=1,2,...
c Is the constant initial force ratio value (0.0777)
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In this case, R~ has a value of -0.2066. Therefore, by
this statistical comparison, these two models do not give
equivalent representations of combat attrition.
B. BETWEEN ENGAGEMENT ANALYSIS
1. Red Force Allocation Scenarios
Recall that MOSCOW not only assumes a constant ratio
of direct to indirect systems within a single engagement,
but also uses this same value for all engagements.
Therefore, another way to assess model performance is to
analyze a model's responses over a range of plausible
scenarios to see if results are reasonable (follow logical
attrition expectations). For this analysis, five scenarios
represent a likely range of force allocation options for the
Red force given a fixed number of combat systems. Starting
with a basic scenario representing the doctrinal
organization of two Soviet maneuver divisions (1849 total
weapon systems), these scenarios contain different
allocations of direct and indirect fire systems. While the
total number of systems is held constant, the differences in
allocation (or force mix) are those which could conceivably
result from changes in doctrine, constraints imposed by
logistics, or prior destruction of forces by enemy action.
The intent of these scenarios is to portray not only a
doctrinal employment of Red forces, but also a range of
force al 1 ocat i ons.
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There are two obvious allocation options which a Red
force commander might face. The first is a situation which
produces a shortage in indirect fire (artillery) systems.
This might result from enemy action which has attrited these
systems and a logistics system which is unable to provide
timely replacements. Faced with this circumstance, a
commander may decide to allocate additional direct fire
(tank) forces. Thus, the doctrinal allocation of weapon
systems has been necessarily altered by the realities of
combat. Similar reasoning easily constructs situations
compelling the second allocation option; a case where
indirect fire systems are used to make up a shortage in
direct fire means. The resulting force allocation indicates
a necessary preponderance of indirect fire assets. This
range of options is seen in the force levels for the five
scenarios considered in this analysis as seen in Table 5.
Scenario 1 is the case where Red is short of indirect fire
systems and attempts to compensate by adding direct fire.
Scenario 5 is the situation in which additional Red indirect
fire weapons redress a shortage of direct fire systems.
Scenario 3 is the doctrinal or base case allocation of these
systems, while Scenario 2 allocation falls between Scenarios
1 and 3 while Scenario 4's allocation Is between Scenarios 3
and 5.
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# of Red # of Red
Direct Indi rect
systems Systems
Scenar i o 1 1749 100
Scenar i o 2 1653 196
Scenar io 3 1557 292
Scenar i o 4 1453 396
Scenar io 5 1349 500









2. Four Cases of Blue Force Allocation
Each Red force listed in Table 5 can be compared
against four Blue force allocations. Current military
doctrine [Ref. 2] suggests the attacker should have between
three to five times the force size of the defender.
Therefore, for this analysis the Blue force will initially
have three times the number of Red direct fire systems in
each scenario (approximately 4-5 U.S. divisions) and
represent the base case for Blue. Three other cases are
developed for the Blue force by a) adding one additional
division (1000 direct vehicles, "pure direct"), b) adding
700 indirect vehicles representing three artillery groups
("pure indirect"), and c) a combination of a and b above
("balanced allocation"). Table 6 represents the twenty
combinations of Red and Blue force structures that are used
for analysis purposes. The first number in each column
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represents the number of direct fire systems of the Blue
force and the second represents the number of indirect fire
systems
.
TABLE 6. BLUE FORCE STRUCTURES USED IN EACH SCENARIO
CASE #12 3 4
Scenario 1 5300/300 6300/300 5300/1000 5800/650
Scenario 2 5000/300 6000/300 5000/1000 5500/650
Scenario 3 4700/300 5700/300 4700/1000 5200/650
Scenario 4 4400/300 5400/300 4400/1000 4900/650
Scenario 5 4100/300 5100/300 4100/1000 4600 -'650
3. Weapon System Attrition as a Measure of
Effect i veness
Obviously, the friendly force commander desires to
minimize his casualties while maximizing enemy casualties.
The heterogeneous model represents the interaction of four
attrition components, namely, the direct and indirect
weapons on each side. It is natural to use a comparison of
the attrition of these components as measures of
effectiveness (MOE) which characterize any given battle.
This is because it Is logical to assume that attrition
beyond a certain point equates to defeat.
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4. Analysis
Because the heterogeneous model separates the direct
and indirect fire attrition effects, results can be used to
depict the individual contribution of each system to enemy
attrition. MOSCOW is unable to do this since it cannot
change the "fixed" percentage of indirect fire regardless of
the Red and Blue force sizes. Figure 4 dlplays a typical
example of how indirect fire can separately contribute to
the enemy's attrition. The chart represents the percentage
of Red direct fire casualties caused by Blue direct and
indirect weapon systems. Blue's force structure is
displayed on the X-axis by the number of direct and indirect
fire systems. The numbers above each bar are the actual
number of vehicles killed by the specific weapon system.
Even though cases 2 and 3 both attrited the Red direct fire
systems to the Red breakpoint criterion (70%), the relative
contribution of Blue indirect versus direct vehicles is
distinctly different for the two cases. Furthermore, a
comparison of cases 1 and 3 shows an increase in Red
attrition (366 vs. 640) when Blue's indirect vehicles are
increased from 300 to 1000 and holding Blue's direct
vehicles constant (5300). The contribution of indirect fire
is significantly more in case 3 than in case 1. Appendix D
is a collection of graphs depicting alternative methods of
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5300/300 6300/300 5300/1000 5800/650
NUMBER OF BLUE DIRECT/INDIRECT VEHICLES
Figure 4. Total Red direct fire casualties, Scenario 1
When the Blue force has a large amount of indirect
weapon systems, the counterbattery battle is over quickly
and therefore Blue is able to concentrate on attrltlng Red's
direct systems earlier in the engagement. An analysis of
Figure 5 indicates that although Blue has caused Red to
reach its indirect system breakpoint criterion (70%) in
cases 2,3, and 4, the resulting percent attrition suffered
by Blue is not the same. In other words, case 3
demonstrates that Blue overpowers the Red indirect force, In
turn receives essentially the same number of casualties
(although a much smaller percentage) and contributes
significantly to Red's direct vehicle attrition (Figure 4).
35
Because MOSCOW cannot calculate the separate effects caused
by Indirect fire, this entire analysis Is not available with
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5300/300 6300/300 5300/1000 5800/650
NUMBER OF BLUE DIRECT/INDIRECT VEHICLES
Figure 5. Counterbattery casualties, Scenario 1
The following graphs (Figures 6-10) illustrate the
entire range of Red scenarios. Analysis of these graphs
shows that the Blue force performance Is heavily dependent
on the Red force composition. Note the trend displayed on
each graph as the Red scenario changes.
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5300/300 6300/300 5300/1000 5800/650
NUMBER OF BLUE DIRECT/INDIRECT VEHICLES
Figure 6. Total Red direct fire casualties, Scenario 1
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5000/300 6000/300 5000/1000 5500/650
NUMBER OF BLUE DIRECT/INDIRECT VEHICLES
Figure 7. Total Red direct fire casualties, Scenario 2
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4700/300 5700/300 4700/1000 5200/650
NUMBER OF BLUE DIRECT/INDIRECT VEHICLES
Figure 8. Total Red direct fire casualties, Scenario 3
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4400/300 5400/300 4400/1000 4900/850
NUMBER OF BLUE DIRECT/INDIRECT VEHICLES
Figure 9. Total Red direct fire casualties, Scenario 4
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100
TOTAL RED DIRECT FIRE CASUALTIES
SCENARIO 5
D RED DIRECT KILLED BY BLUE INDIRECT










4100/300 5100/300 4100/1000 4600/650
NUMBER OF BLUE DIRECT/INDIRECT VEHICLES
Figure 10. Total Red direct fire casualties, Scenario 5
Three comparisons will be discussed in detail using
the five graphs. First, Case 2 demonstrates the importance
of augmenting the Blue force with a comparable type
attrition weapon as that used by Red enemy force
augmentation. This implies that as Red augments with direct
fire systems, then Blue should do likewise. In the first
three scenarios, Case 2 Is able to maintain a 70% direct
fire casualty attrition on the Red force. But, when the
scenario changes to either scenario 4 or 5, Red's attrition
is below Its breakpoint criterion (i.e., Blue is no longer
able to cause Red to lose 70% of his direct fire systems).
This result occurred because Red's composition was
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Increasing in indirect fire systems, the Blue force was
augmenting with direct systems (vehicle mismatch) and,
therefore, Blue is unable to attrit the Red force as much as
in the earlier scenarios. Given the history of mechanized
warfare in the twentieth century, this relationship seems
reasonabl e
.
The second comparison involves the third Blue case
("pure indirect"). In this case, the Blue force has 1000
indirect systems while the Red force initially has only 100
(Scenario 1). As mentioned earlier, this large weapons
ratio (10:1), allows Blue to easily defeat the Red artillery
and assist early in the direct attrition battle. But, as
the Red force increases its number of indirect vehicles
(Scenarios 2-5), the Blue force must allocate more of its
weapon systems to the count erbat tery war and therefore has
fewer systems remaining in which to assist in the direct
attrition battle. Finally, in Scenario 5, the Red force has
accumulated sufficient indirect systems so that the Blue
indirect systems are kept at bay and therefore their
contribution to the direct attrition is severely reduced
(from 640 to 244)
.
The third comparison involves the augmented mix
version of Blue's force structure (Case 4). Scenario 5
clearly shows that while the attrition of Red decreased for
both Case 2 and Case 3, the augmented mix structure of the
Blue force was able to cause Red to be attrited to its
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breakpoint. In fact, Case 4's attrition on the Red force is
70% for all five scenarios. Therefore, as the enemy force
increased the ratio of its indirect fire systems, an
augmented mixed force did consistently better than either a
"pure direct" or "pure indirect" addition. The reason is
that as Red's force structure changed, Blues composition
changed to meet the new threat (i.e. a "pure direct" or a
"pure indirect" augmentation fared worse than a balanced
augmentation of both direct and indirect systems). Case 4's
augmentation of indirect systems was able to offset the
increase in Red's indirect systems. As more of Blue s
indirect systems were used to fight the counterbat tery war
(resulting from Red s increase in indirect weapons), the
resulting decrease of Blues indirect effort of attriting




The importance of a heterogeneous allocation and
attrition model is that it allows analysis to be conducted
both "within" and "between" engagements by using different
force structures for the Blue force. The previous graphs
demonstrated that although an augmented mix version of
Blue's force structure tends to perform well in all
scenarios, the "best" Blue structure is heavily dependent
upon the composition of the Red (enemy) force (different
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force mixes for Blue produce different results when facing
similar Red forces). MOSCOW, on the other hand, is unable
to alter the force structures for different engagements.
Therefore, over a range of five different and plausible
scenarios, the heterogeneous model demonstrates proper
battle dynamics which the MOSCOW model cannot show.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The development of MOSCOW by Philip Romero was an
attempt to fill a void in current combat models. It has
been noted, however, that there are problems as the model
currently exists [Ref. 3], but it is this authors opinion
that as an individual project, Romero did a good job.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The use of certain assumptions within MOSCOW pose
limitations in analyzing output and therefore tends to
overstate or understate the actual remaining force
structures. The reason is simple; MOSCOW offers a trade-off
in model complexity for resolution by using a single
attrition coefficient. On the other hand, the use of a
heterogeneous model, although more complex in its attrition
development, appears to provide adequate results and clearly
overcomes the conceptual problem of treating indirect fire
in a Lanchester square law context.
If MOSCOW is to be useful, then an appropriate model
should allow for the introduction of different force mixes
to be used in analysis given varying threat compositions.
Commanders do not think in terms of generic units but rather
in terms of direct and indirect forces available for use in
batt 1 e .
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
A heterogeneous Lanchester attrition representation
capable of separately calculating the effects of both direct
and indirect fire within the structure of MOSCOW would allow
users to have more flexibility in developing their force
compositions for analytical purposes.
The development of a heterogeneous model could be used
as a tool to determine the type(s) of Blue force structures
that are best suited to warfighting given predicted
scenarios for Red forces.
C. POSSIBLE EMBELLISHMENTS
Refining the internal programming of MOSCOW (or defining
the specific approach) necessary to allow the insertion of a
heterogeneous attrition representation is a broad area for
future research. The intent of subsequent research would be
to restructure the current version of MOSCOW so that it may
maintain its concept of warfighting capability but have the
flexibility to handle heterogeneous units as opposed to
generic units. A further study involving the effects caused
by the attrition of indirect fire systems by direct systems
may be useful in the evaluation of future warfighting
concepts
.
The heterogeneous model, as it currently exists, is a
descriptive model; i.e., it describes the effects of certain
input force structures. The development of a prescriptive
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model which informs commanders as to the type of forces best
suited to war winning would certainly assist them in their
decisions.
Finally, the development of an optimizing program
(possibly Involving a search for the "optimal" path) to
determine the composition of the "best" Blue structure given
a) possible choices of Red threats, or b) a defined Red
threat, would be useful to commanders. This method could
involve network methodology that maximizes the minimum paths




APPENDIX A. PROGRAM CODE FOR THE HETEROGENEOUS MODEL
The heterogeneous model was programmed in APL due to its
ease in handling vectors and matrices. The actual code of
the program is listed on the following pages. Once the
initial inputs have been established (and placed within the
program code), the model is simple to use. Following a
prompt, the user inputs his desired number of direct and
indirect weapon systems. Calculations are then made such as
the number of vehicles able to fire, the attrition caused by
each weapon system type and the distance moved by these
systems. Weapon systems are allowed to shoot and move in
every time interval.
The percentage remaining (by weapon system) is then
output. The program updates all variables (e.g. number of
direct fire systems remaining) and conducts a check with the
breakpoint criterion as discussed in Chapter 3. If no
breakpoints are reached, the model then calculates the
attrition that will occur in the next time interval until a
system s breakpoint criterion has been reached.
At this point in the engagement (based upon the input
data), a decision is made as to battle success or failure
and outputs the results. Model run time is on the order of
seconds. A sample output of the model is included at the
end of the program listing.
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The following list is a description of the variables
that are used in the APL program developed for analysis in
this thesi s
.




































.Attrition coefficient for Red firer.
.Attrition coefficient for Blue firer.
.Allocation of fire priority for Red firer.
.Allocation of fire priority for Blue firer.
Actual attrition to be imposed on Red force.
.Cumulative vector of Blue direct casualties.
Blue vehicles hits per minute calculation #3
.Cumulative vector of Blue indirect casualtie
Cumulative vector of Blues ratio of indirec
direct fire systems.
Blue will stop the counterattack if Blue rec
this much attr i t i on
.




?urv 1 v 1 n<
cu
direct vehicles
f i rers . ca
'
f i rers . ca 1 cu 1 at i on
u e indirect f i r e r
s
Blue indirect firers vs.
Percent of Blue
Firing rate for Blue
Firing rate for Blue
Attrition rate for Bl
ca 1 cu 1 at i on #3
.
Final attrition rate for
Blue direct.
Final attrition rate for
Blue indirect.
Percent of Blue indirect vehicle
Range variable for Blue vehicles.
Cumulative casualties to Red direct by
di rect .
Cumulative casualties to
i ndi rect .
Cumulative casualties to




Cumulative casualties to B
indirect .










Blue indirect fire r
sur v i v i ng.
Blue
direct by Blue














direct fire system casualties.
indirect fire system casualties.
direct fire system casualties.
indirect fire system casualties.
Red force direct fire system casualties.
Red force indirect fire system casualties.
Flag for Blue direct breakpoint.
Flag for Blue indirect breakpoint.
Counter variable for increasing force sizes.
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CPD Fl ag for
CPDBD Flag for




CUMRAN. . . .Vector of
CUMTIM. . . .Vector of
Red direct breakpoint.
Red and Blue direct breakpoint.
Red direct and Blue indirect break
Red indirect breakpoint.
Red indirect and Blue direct break
Red and Blue indirect breakpoint.
ranges each time interval.
all times used in simulation.
point .
point .
CUPRAN .... Current range between opposing forces.
CUPBR Current range for Blue firers, Red targets.
CUPRB Current range for Red firers, Blue targets.
C3EPR C3 Error (degradation).
DELTAT . . . .Time interval (minutes) for time step.
DISENG . . . .The fraction of engagements in which Blue i








































moved by Blue direct vehicles.
moved by Blue indirect vehicles.
moved by Red direct vehicles.
moved by Red indirect vehicles.
Average firing rate per system when moving.
Average firing rate per system when station
.Probability of hit per
mov i ng
.
.Probabi 1 i t y of
stat i onary .
Probabi 1 i t y of
target moving.
Probab i 1 i ty of
round, fi rer moving









f i r e r
f i r e r
t arge






















used in do- 1 oop for row variable
number of direct fire vehicles.
number of indirect fire vehicles.
used in do- 1 oop for column variable
..Probability of kill given hit for Blue fire
..Probability of kill given hit for Red firer
..Kill per round probability for Blue indirec
..Kill per round probability for Red indirect
..Casualties to Red direct by Blue direct.
to Red direct by Blue indirect.
to Red indirect by Blue indirect
to Blue direct by Red direct,
to Blue direct by Red indirect,
to Blue indirect by Red indirect
Maximum effective range of weapon systems.
Blue miscellaneous multipliers (degradation
Miscellaneous multiplier (degradation) for
lethal ity.
Red miscellaneous multipliers (degradation)
t fire
fire.
. Casua 1 t i es
. Casua 1 t i es
. Casua 1 t i es
. Casua 1 1 ies
. Casual t i es
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MISCVU . . . . M i see ] 1 aneous multiplier (degradation) for
vul nerabj 1 i ty
.
MU Weapon accuracy parameter used as an exponent .
NUMVED. .. .Number of direct fire vehicles.
NUMVEI .... Number of i ndi rect fire veh i cl es.
PERMM Percent of engagement firer moving, target
st at i onary
.
PERMS Percent of engagement firer moving, target
stat i onary
PEPSM Percent of engagement firer stationary, target
mov i ng
.
PEPSS Percent of engagement firer stationary, target
stat i onary
RANGE Initial starting range in meters.
RD Cumulative vector Red direct casualties.
REDDES. . . .What Red desires to be attrited by a Blue attack.
PEDDIR ... .Percent of Red direct vehicles surviving,
REDID! ... .Fi r i ng rate for Red firers, calculation #1 .
PEDID2 . . . . Fi r i ng rate for Red firers, calculation #2.
PEDI D3 . . . . At t r i t i on rate for Red indirect firers calculation
#3.
REDID Final attrition rate for Red indirect firers vs.
Blue direct.
PEDI I Final attrition rate for Red indirect firers vs.
Blue i ndi rect .
REDIMD ... .Percent of Red indirect vehicles surviving,
RHTMN3 . . . . Red firers hits per minute calculation #3.
PI Cumulative vector of Red indirect casualties.
RRANVA ... .Range multiplier for Red vehicles.
TIME Current time in simulation.
TOTAL Dummy variable used for output calculations.
VEFI BR .... Percent of vehicles firing. Blue vs. Ped.
VEFIRB ... .Percent of vehicles firing, Red vs. Blue.
VEHSPD . . . . Veh i c 1 e speed in meters per minute.
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THE HETEROGENEOUS MODEL CODE IS LISTED BELOW,
[1] ^INITIALIZE VARIABLES
[2] R



































;i6] CRDBD+0h 17] CRIBI<-0
CRDBI+0
CRIBD+0
;20l r\MU IS THE WEAPON ACCURACY PARAMETER
;21] MU+ 22p0.90.900
nKILL PER HIT CALCULATIONS
KILLRR+ 2 2 p 0.65 0.1 0.4
KILLHB+ 2 2 p 0.65 0.1 0.4
LOOP8 0:
^ALLOCATION OF FIRE VARIABLES
ALLOIJ+ 22pl00.60.4
ALLOJI+ 2 2p 10. 700. 3
^NUMBER OF VEHICLES , DIRECT
NUMVED+ 1557 2976
NUMVEI+ 4 24 24 3
o INPUT DESIRED NUMBER OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT VEHICLES
nFOR THE BLUE FORCE
38] 'INPUT DESIRED NUMBER OF DIRECT VEHICLES'
[39. NUMVED121+U
[no: 'INPUT DESIRED NUMBER OF INDIRECT VEHICLES'
;m] NUMVEH21+-Q
;U2] BIRATI+NUMVEI [2] *NUMVEDt2l
"43 ] p
44] +(COUNT=0)pLOOP81
4 5 ] NUMVEI [ 2
]
+NUMVEI [ 2 ] + ( COUNT* 1 )
46] L00P81:












;59; rKJLL PEi? fltftWD FOfl INDIRECT FIRE
'60; KPRRI+ 0.00002 0.00006
.61, KPRBI+ 0.00002 0.00012
62. R
63; ^MISCELLANEOUS LETHALITY AND VULNERABILITY MULTIPLIERS
!64, r
;65J MISCLE+ 2 2 p 1 1 1 1
,66] MISCVU+ 2 2 p 1 1 1 1
67; r
[68] ninitial starting range in meters
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RANGE* 2 2 p 5000 10000 10000 15000
CURRAN+RANGE
^CUMULATIVE RANGE VECTOR
CUMRAN+CURRAN [ 1 ; 1
]
P
;7 5] ^INITIAL VEHICLE SPEED IN METERS PER MINUTE
.76. VEHSPD+ 2 2 p 60 120 20 50
"77; p
78] ^CURRENT TIME OF SIMULATION
TIME+0
fiVECTOR OF TIME INTERVALS
CUMTIM+TIME
R STOPPING CRITERIA
nBLUE'S DESIRED ATTRITION ON RED FORCES
BLUDES+0.7S




nTHE FRACTION OF ENGAGEMENTS IN WHICH BLUE IS PRESUMED TO
rBF ABLE TO DICTATE THE DURATION OF THE BATTLE
DISENG+0.8




QBLUE WILL STOP THE COUNTERATTACK IF BLUE RECEIVES THIS MUCH
pATTRITION
BLUATT+0.5
!103] ^AVERAGE FIRING RATE IN ROUNDS/MINUTE
;iOU] FIRRAS+ 2 2 p 2 2 2 2
10 5] FIRRAM+ 2 2 p 1 1
106] R
107] ^PERCENTAGE OF VEHICLES CAPABLE OF FIRING
108] VEFIRB+ 2 2 p 0.5 0.5 0.5













VEFIRB+VEFIRBx(ls> 2 2 pNUMVEDi 1] .NUMVEI [1] )
VEFIBR+VEF1BR*(2 2 pNUMVED [2] , NUMVEI [2]
)
^PERCENT OF ENGAGEMENT STATIONARY /MOVING (FIRER, TARGET)
PERSS+ 2 2 p 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.16
PERSM+ 2 2 p 0.81 0.01 0.64 0.64
PERMS*- 2 2 p 0.01 0.81 0.04 0.04
PERMM+ 2 2 p 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.16
R
120] fiHIT PER ROUND FIRED STATIONARY /MOVING {FIRER, TARGET)
HITRSS+ 2 2 p 0.75 0.4 0.8 0.8
HITRSM+ 2 2 p 0.47 0.Z 0.3 0.3
HITRMS+ 2 2 p 0.25 0.1
HITRMM<r 2 2 p 0.19 0.05
fiHITS PER MINUTE CALCULATION 1
HTMINl<rFIRRASxUPERSSxHITRSS) + (PERSM-*HITRSM))




C3ERR+ 2 2 p
nHITS PER MINUTE CALCULATION 2
HTMIN2+HTMIN1* ( 1-C3ERR
)
^MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE RANGE OF WEAPON SYSTEMS IN METERS
MAXEFF+ 2 2 p 3000 3000 15300 18100





AT TIME CONDITIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
i
NUMBER OF BLUE DIRECT VEHICLES
,
NUMBER OF BLUE INDIRECT VEHICLES
NUMBER OF RED DIRECT VEHICLES *
NUMBER OF RED INDIRECT VEHICLES


















nUPDATE RUN TIME OF MODEL AND CUMULATIVE TIME VECTOR
TIME+TIME+DELTAT
CUMTIM+CUMTIM , TIME
^CHANGE VEHICLE SPEED WHEN UNITS ARE ENGAGED IN DIRECT FIRE
+(CURRANll ; 1]>3 000 )pL00P13
VEHSPD+ 2 2 p 10 40 20
L00P13:
^CALCULATE THE DISTANCE EACH SYSTEM MOVES IN
pA TIME INTERVAL
"







































fiKEEP VARIABLES SEPARATE FOR RED AND BLUE RANGES
CURRB+CURRAN '
CURBR+CURRAN
nUPDATE CUMULATIVE RANGE VECTOR
CUMRAN+CUMRAN , CURRAN [ 1 ; 1
]




100P2 : *(CURRBLItJ] <,MAXEFFU ; 1 ] )pLOOPn
CURRBII ; Jl+MAXEFFLI :1J
L00Pn: + (CURBRU\J]<,MAXEFFU\2] )pL00P12
CURBRII | Jlt-MAXEFFU |2]














































































RRANVA+ 2 2 p ( , (1- (CURRB* («5





pBLUE AND RED HIT PER MINUTE CALCULATION
RHTMN3+(*> 2 2 pHTMIN2 [ : 1 ] )xRRANVA
BHTMN3+(2 2 pHTMIN2 [ ; 2 J )xBRANVA
P
pFINAL ATTRITION VARIABLES FOR RED FIRER
REDID1+FIRRA
S
[ 2 ; 1 ]
x
(PERSS [ 2 5 1
]
+PERSM
REDID2+FIRRAM [ 2 ; 1 J x (PERMS [ 2 ; 1
1
+PERMM
REDID3+KPRRI [ 1 ] x (
l
-C3ERR [ 2 ; 1 ] ) *ALLOTJ
REDID+REDID3X (REDID1+REDID2)
REDII+KPRRI [ 2 ] x (
l
-C3ERR [ 2 ; 1 ] ) x (REDID1+REDID2 ) xALLOTJ [ 2 ; 2
]
AIJ+RHTMN3 xRILLHRxALLOIJ
AIJ+ 2 2 pUlJ[l;l] ,/5JJ[l;2] ,REDID,REDID
P
pFINAL ATTRITION VARIABLES FOR BLUE FIRER
BLUIDl+FIRRASi 2 ; 2 ] x f PEflSS [ 2
;
21+PERSML2




flLt/IJ*-KP/?FI[2]x/lLLOJ7[2:2]x(i-C3E/7i?[2;2] )x (BLUID1+BLUID2 )
AJI+BHTMN3 xRILLHBxALLOJI
AJI+ 2 2 p (AJ1 [1 ; 1] ,BLUID,AJI [2; 1] ,BLUII)
^MISCELLANEOUS LETHALITY AND VULNERABILITY MULTIPLIERS
MISCR+MISCLExMl SCVU
MISCB<-MISCLExMISCVU
MISCR+t* 2 2 pM7SC/?[;l]




































CASD+( CASRD , CA SBD
)
CASI+(CASRI , CASBI
pUPDATE FORCE SIZE NUMBER OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT VEHICLES
NUMVED+(NUMVED-CASD)[0 .001
NUMVEI+(NUMVEI-CASI)\0 .001













REDDIR+NUMVED [ 1 *INITLD [ 1
REDIND<-(NUMVEI [1] tINITLI [1] )T0
BIRATI+BIRATI , (NUMVEI [ 2
]





































































































ALLOJI+ 2 2 p 1
ALLOIJ+ 2 2 p 1 1
LOOP2H:





ALLOJI+ 2 2 p 1 1
ALLOIJ+ 2 2 p 1
LOOP25:
-»-( ( {REDDIR<{1-ATTR) )*(BLUDIR<BLUATT) ) = )pLOOP26
^{CRDBD-l)pLOOP^n
'BOTH RD AND BD AFFECTED'
CRDBD+l
LOOPW.
ALLOIJ+ 2 2 p 1
ALLOJI+ 2 2 p 1
LOOP26:
*-{(lREDIND<0.3 )*(BLVIND<0.3 )) = 0)pLOOP27
+(CRIBI=l)pLOOFn5






+ U(REDDIR<(l-ATTR))A(BLUIND<0.3)) = 0)pLOOP28
+(CRDBI=l)pLOOPn6
'BOTH RD AND BI AFFECTED'
CRDBI+1
LOOPnb: '
ALLOI J<- 2 2 p 1
AILOJI+ 2 2 p
LOOP28:
-»•( ( (REDIND<0.3)A(BLUDIR<BLUATT)) = 0)pLOOP29
^{CRIBD-\ )pLOOPm
'BOTH RI AND BD AFFECTED'
CRIBD+1
LOOPH7:
ALLOIJ+ 2 2 p
A£LOJI+ 2 2 p 1
L00P29:




nOUTPUT DESIRED TIME INTERVALS
+UTIME=l)v(il-REDDIR)2ATTR)v((TIME*10)=(L(TIME*10))))pLOOP20


















































































(vTIME), ' RANGE IS '
,
{9CURRAN LI ill )
nIF BREAKPOINT CRITERIA HAS BEEN REACHED STOP BATTLE







' MISSION FAILED '






































n + (INITLIL21 $500 )pLOOP80
LOOPll:
FINAL BLUE DIRECT FIRE CASUALTIES












































, (V + /LORDBD)
'









, (9 + /L0BIRI)
A SAMPLE OUTPUT IS LISTED BELOW.
INPUT DESIRED NUMBER OF DIRECT VEHICLES
D:
6228




AT TIME CONDITIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS'.
NUMBER OF BLUE DIRECT VEHICLES 6228
NUMBER OF BLUE INDIRECT VEHICLES 484
NUMBER OF RED DIRECT VEHICLES 1557
NUMBER OF RED INDIRECT VEHICLES 4 24









TIME IS 1 RANGE IS
TIME IS 2 RANGE IS
TIME IS 3 RANGE IS
TIME IS 4 RANGE IS
TIME IS 5 RANGE IS
TIME IS 6 RANGE IS
TIME IS 7 RANGE IS
TIME IS 8 RANGE IS
TIME IS 9 RANGE IS
TIME IS 10 RANGE IS
TIME IS 11 RANGE IS
TIME IS 12 RANGE IS
TIME IS 13 RANGE IS
TIME IS 14 RANGE IS
TIME IS 15 RANGE IS
TIME IS 16 RANGE IS
TIME IS 17 RANGE IS
TIME IS 18 RANGE IS
TIME IS 19 RANGE IS
TIME IS 20 RANGE IS
TIME IS 21 RANGE IS
TIME IS 22 RANGE IS
TIME IS 23 RANGE IS
TIME IS 24 RANGE IS
TIME IS 25 RANGE IS
TIME IS 26 RANGE IS
TIME IS 27 RANGE IS
TIME IS 28 RANGE IS
TIME IS 29 RANGE IS
TIME IS 30 RANGE IS
TIME IS 31 RANGE IS
TIME IS 32 RANGE IS
TIME IS 33 RANGE IS
TIME IS 34 RANGE IS
TIME IS 35 RANGE IS






































TIME IS 37 RANGE IS 2245
TIME IS 38 RANGE IS 2208
TIME IS 39 RANGE IS 2171
TIME IS 40 RANGE IS 2134
TIME IS m RANGE IS 2097
BLUDIR AFFECTED
TIME IS 42 RANGE IS 2060
TIME IS 43 RANGE IS 2023
TIME IS 44 RANGE IS 1986
TIME IS 45 RANGE IS 1949
TIME IS 46 RANGE IS 1912
REDDIR AFFECTED
BOTH RD AND BD .AFFECTED
TIME IS 47 RANGE IS 1875
TIME IS 48 RANGE IS 1838
TIME IS 49 RANGE IS 1801
TIME IS 50 RANGE IS 1764
TIME IS 51 RANGE IS 1727
TIME IS 52 RANGE IS 1690
TIME IS 53 RANGE IS 1653
TIME IS 54 RANGE IS 1616
TIME IS 55 RANGE IS 1579
TIME IS 56 RANGE IS 1542
TIME IS 57 RANGE IS 1505
TIME IS 58 RANGE IS 1468
REDIND AFFECTED
BOTH RI AND BD .AFFECTED
TIME IS 59 RANGE IS 1431
MISSION SUCCESSFUL 1. II
RED RECEIVED 0.7014500412 PERCENT CASUALTIES
FINAL BLUE DIRECT FIRE CASUALTIES 0.5081024927
FINAL RED DIRECT FIRE CASUALTIES 0.7014500412































APPENDIX B. INPUTS USED IN THE MODEL
The following list shows the current values and shape of
the variables that are used in the APL program (shape
corresponds to the size of the vector or matrix).
Abbreviations used in the application column (i.e. BD
represents Blue direct weapon systems) specify the location













VALUES APPLI CATION SHj=iPE
1 .00 .00 RD-BD RD--BI (. -
.60 . 40 RI--BD RI--BI
i .00 .70 3D--RD BI--RD i-j 2
.00 .30 BD--RI BI--RI
.50
.75
.00 .00 RD BD <^>
.00 .00 RI BI
1 .00
.80
1 .00 1 .00 RD BD oCa 2
0.00 .00 RI BI
2.00 2 .00 RD BD --> C*
2.00 2 .00 RI BI
. 19 .05 RD BD tl*
0.00 .00 RI BI
58
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HITRSM .47 .20 RD BD
.30 .30 PI BI
HITRSS .75 .40 RD BD
.80 .80 RI BI
KILLHB .65 .10 BD-RD BI-RD
0.00 .40 BD-RI BI-PI
KILLHR .65 0.00 RD-BD RD-BI
.10 .40 RI-BD RI-BI
KPRBI .00002 .00012 BI-RD BI-RI
KPRRI .00002 .00006 RI-BD RI-BI
MAXEFF 3000.00 3000.00 RD BD
15300.00 18100.00 RI BI
MISCLE 1.00 1.00 RD BD
1.00 1.00 RI BI
MI3CVIJ 1.00 1.00 RD BD
1 .00 1 .00 RI BI
MU .90 .90 RD BD
0.00 0.00 RI BI
NUMVED 1557.00 2976.00 RD BD
NUMV] 424.00 243.00 RI BI
PERMM .09 .09 RD BD
.16 .16 RI BI
PERMS .01 .81 RD BD
.04 .04 RI BI
PERSM .81 .01 RD BD 2 2
.64 .64 RI BI
PERSS .09 .09 RD BD 2 2
.16 .16 RI BI
RANGE 5000.00 10000.00 RD-BD PD-BI 2 2







.25 .50 BD-RD BI-RD
.00 .50 BD-RI BI-RI
.50 .00 RD-BD RD-BI
.50 .50 RI-BD RI-BI
60.00 120 .00 RD BD
20.00 50 .00 RI BI
60
APPENDIX C. ATTRITION COEFFICIENT CALCULATIONS
The formulas used to calculate the attrition
coefficients by weapon system C A
j j ) for use with the
Lanchester attrition equations are shown below. More
detailed explanations on Lanchester i an attrition theory and
calculations is given in Taylor tRef. 61.
For direct fire weapons:
A,j = PyxHTlJkx(%Mxvim + %S|Xv te)*(I - C3,)x(l - -|- V'jrY^MLE.xMVU (16)
having units of (# kllled)/(# flrers)(unlt time).
For indirect fire weapons:
Ay = QtJx{% Mxvim + %StXvis)x( 1 - C3 i)xxY ijxM LE.rMVU (17)
having units of (tt kllled)/<# firers)(# targets) (un 1 t time).
Where
,
Ajj = Attrition coefficient for i firer, j target
Pj: =Probability of kill given hit (i firer, j target)
Qj: =Probability of kill given shot (i firer, j target)
HTjj^ =Probability of hit per shot (i firer, j target, k
moving or stationary)
%Mj =Percent of the time system i is moving
v im =System i rate of fire when moving
%Sj =Percent of the time system i is stationary









= Degradat i on due to intelligence error for systerr, i
=Current distance between forces.
=Maximum effective range cf system i.
^Weapon accuracy parameter for system i.
=Percent of allocation of i firer to j target.
=M i see 1 1 aneous lethality mu 1 1 i p 1 i er
.
Miscellaneous vulnerability multiplier.
Therefore, using the convention of X as the Blue force and Y
as the Red force, with a and b as the attrition coefficients
(from Equations 16 and 17) for the Blue and Ped forces,
respectively, the following equations are produced.
For Blue direct at t r i t i on
,
dXD/dt = -b2XDYj -bfi'Q (18)
and for Blue indirect attrition.
dXj/dt = -b3XjYj (19)
Similarly, the direct attrition of Ped becomes:
dYr'dt = -a2YDXj -aiXD (20:
and for Red indirect systems.
dYjdt = -a3Y I X I (21
)
These equations are described in Table 3 of Chapter 3.
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APPENDIX D. RELATED GRAPHS
The following charts (Figures 11 and 12) show another
method of representing separate attrition effects during an
engagement. Recall from Chapter 4 that the Red threat
consisted of five distinct scenarios. Only one scenario





attr i 1 1 on





Figure 12. 3-Dlmensl ona 1 Graph depicting Red indirect
attr i t ion
Surface graphs (I.e. Figures 11 and 12) render a broader
view of the heterogeneous model's performance. Recall the
analysis discussion in Chapter 4 reference Scenario 5. The
Red threat was characterized by possessing 500 indirect
weapon systems. Analysis from these graphs allow planar
cuts along the X and Y axis to represent the four cases of
Blue force structures discussed in detail In Chapter 4.
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